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Comment
GEORGIA v. RANDOLPH:
A JEALOUSLY GUARDED EXCEPTION—
CONSENT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT†
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of Fourth Amendment1 jurisprudence traces the struggle
of successive courts to define “reasonableness,” and balance the
competing needs of personal privacy and police efficiency.2 Generally,
the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for all government searches
and seizures.3 However, the United States Supreme Court has held that
a warrantless search is allowed if a pre-existing exemption applies.4 For

Winner of the 2006 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition.
The Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2
See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
552 (1999). Davies explains that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has changed sharply
over the past one hundred years due to an increase in the authority given to police officers
since the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Id. Specifically, Davies argues that the
nineteenth century saw the rise of law enforcement officers’ ex officio authority to arrest
and search, a development that was not anticipated by the framers of the Constitution. Id.
In the wake of this expansion of duties, officers gained discretionary search and seizure
power that was not easily controlled by authority of the warrant system. Id. In contrast,
Davies observes, at the time the Bill of Rights were adopted, the primary source of
searching and seizing power came from the judicial warrant system, with officers on the
street having only meager power. Id. Accordingly, the text of the Fourth Amendment
deals with the possibility of judges issuing warrants too leniently, without probable cause.
Id. Yet, due to the rise in police power, much of the current judicial debate surrounding the
Fourth Amendment is concerned with the behavior of officers in their day to day activities.
Id.
3
See Thirty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Overview of the Fourth
Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 5 (2003). This article describes the clauses of the Fourth
Amendment, the first of which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, the second of
which requires that a warrant issued to search or seize property must be supported by
probable cause. Id. Although the two requirements in the Amendment are written as
independent clauses, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the Fourth Amendment as
requiring a warrant for searches and seizures. Id. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) (stating that searches conducted outside the judicial warrant system,
without the prior approval of a judge, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment).
4
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. Warrantless searches and seizures are valid when: (1) they
are made incident to an arrest; (2) they are done while in hot pursuit of a criminal; or (3)
†
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example, warrantless searches are allowed when an individual
possessing authority has given the police consent to conduct a search.5
Yet numerous cases have illustrated the difficulty in determining
who has legal authority over premises such that consent is valid under
the Fourth Amendment.6 In 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Georgia v. Randolph to determine whether third-party consent—
ordinarily valid under the Fourth Amendment—remains valid in the
presence of primary party refusal.7 In a departure from numerous circuit
court decisions, the Supreme Court held that primary party refusal
renders third party consent irrelevant such that a warrantless search
violates the Fourth Amendment.8
This Comment will first examine the facts present in Georgia v.
Randolph. Second, this Comment will present the evolution of the
Court’s rulings on consent to warrantless searches and seizures,
including rulings concerning third party consent. Finally, this Comment
will analyze the Supreme Court’s holding in Randolph, first arguing that
the majority’s social expectations test is a flawed method under which to
analyze third party consent, and second, arguing that cases decided
they are undertaken with the consent of an individual who owns the property being
searched. Id.
5
See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (holding that a warrantless search of
a person’s home is allowed when the police have the voluntary consent of the individual
whose property is being searched, or the consent of a third party who has common
authority over the property).
6
Most cases involving third party consent to warrantless searches and seizures include
an assessment of whether or not the person who gave consent had the legal authority to do
so according to prevailing notions of property rights. See generally United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (holding that a third party who shares ownership of property
with a non-present individual whose property is being searched can consent to a search
under the Fourth Amendment because the third party’s relationship to the property is such
that they possess common authority over the premises). See generally Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964) (holding that a hotel clerk cannot consent to a search of a guest’s
hotel room because a clerk lacks valid authority over the property).
7
Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006). In granting certiorari, the Court
noted that its reason for doing so was to resolve a split of authority. Id. Specifically, the
court stated that four courts of appeals and the majority (but not all) of state courts have
considered the question at issue in Randolph, holding that consent remains effective even in
the face of an express objection. Id. at 1520 n.1
8
Id. at 1523 (holding that the disputed invitation of one co-tenant over the objection of
another present co-tenant constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment because a co-tenant has no recognized authority to prevail over a present and
objecting co-tenant). But see United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that third party consent remains effective in the face of express objection); United
States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684,
687 (6th Cir. 1977) (same).
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subsequent to Randolph illustrate the weaknesses inherent in the social
expectations test.
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH
In July 2001, following a domestic dispute, Janet Randolph called the
police to report that her husband, Scott Randolph, had taken their son
away.9 When the police arrived at the couple’s Americus, Georgia home,
Janet told the officers that her husband was a cocaine user and
volunteered to show the police the drug paraphernalia she claimed Scott
kept in the house.10 Following Janet’s consent to the search, the police
asked Scott for permission to search the house, which he refused to
give.11 Janet then escorted the officer to an upstairs bedroom where they
found a drinking straw covered in cocaine residue, which the officer
confiscated.12
Scott Randolph was later indicted for possession of cocaine based on
the evidence collected during the warrantless search.13 Scott moved to
suppress the evidence, claiming that his objection to the search nullified
his wife’s consent.14 The trial court denied the motion, holding that Janet
had common authority to consent to the search.15 The Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that, in the face of Scott’s refusal, Janet’s
permission was invalid.16 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the
decision and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
2005.17

Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
Id.
11
Id. See also Brief for the Respondent, Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006) (Sept.
1, 2005) (No. 04-1067) (stating that not only did Scott Randolph refuse to give police
permission to search the house, but his parents—the actual owners of the house—also
refused permission via the telephone).
12
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
13
Id. Although the officer later obtained a warrant to search the property, the evidence
Scott Randolph sought to suppress was that which had been collected during the original
warrantless search. Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1520.
9

10
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III. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution18 governs
all government searches and seizures.19 However it was not until 1967,
in Katz v. United States, that the Supreme Court first enumerated the
social expectations test, determining that a search has occurred under the
Fourth Amendment when society recognizes that an individual should
have a right to privacy under the circumstances present.20 Nonetheless,
despite the announcement of the social expectations test, judicial debate
regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment continued throughout the
twentieth century.21 In fact, numerous cases have examined the issue of

18
See supra note 1 (providing the text of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution).
19
See supra note 2 (discussing Davies’ history of the Fourth Amendment, as it evolved
from a measure preventing courts from issuing overly broad warrants to a mechanism that
bars police officers from disregarding individual property rights by requiring that they
seek a warrant prior to conducting a search).
20
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). In Katz, the defendant was prosecuted
based on evidence that was collected by the government through an electronic listening
device that had been installed in a public telephone booth without the defendant’s
knowledge. Id. at 348. The Court first determined that the listening device constituted a
search despite the fact that there was no physical breach of the phone booth, because the
defendant had an expectation that his conversation would be private. Id. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that the search was unreasonable because the government had not
first obtained a warrant. Id. at 359. Furthermore, Justice Harlan, writing in a dissenting
opinion, established the social expectations test to determine when a search has taken place
such that the Fourth Amendment is in play. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenging). First, an
individual must have an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.” Id. Second, society
must recognize this expectation of privacy to be reasonable. Id. If both criteria are met, and
police have invaded this right to privacy, then the Fourth Amendment is violated. Id.
21
See Davies, supra note 2, at 551. Davies argues that the framers never anticipated that
“unreasonable searches and seizures” language would be read as the standard for
warrantless intrusions that it has become in modern interpretation, but instead the framers
simply used the term “unreasonable” to describe any searches and seizures that might be
made under a general warrant. Id. Davies identifies two sides to the warrant debate: the
“warrant-preference” proponents, who see the need for a warrant as the primary tenant of
the Fourth Amendment, and the “generalized-reasonableness” proponents, who assert that
the Fourth Amendment merely assures that warrantless searches ought to be judged based
on a standard of “reasonableness.” Id. at 553. Furthermore, Davies argues that both
interpretations ignore the original meaning of the term “unreasonable,” which, he claims
referred only to the inherent illegality of general warrants. Id. at 556. However, Davies
also asserts that the original interpretation of the amendment ought not to govern modern
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. Instead, Davies argues, the Fourth Amendment
should be interpreted in light of the framers overall purpose—to curb the discretionary
power of officers. Id.
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when consent to a government search is proper, such that no warrant is
necessary under the Fourth Amendment.22
For example, in 1973, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Court held that
voluntary consent of the individual against whom incriminating
evidence is sought is valid to allow a warrantless search.23 However, the
consent exception was soon complicated by the issue of third-party
consent.24 First, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Court held that when a
third party turns evidence over to the police, it does not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment.25 However a few years later, in
United States v. Matlock, the Supreme Court examined third party consent
when an actual warrantless search has taken place.26 In Matlock, the

22
The exception of voluntary consent to government searches was already well
established by the time Katz was decided. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499
(1958) (Justice Harlan famously referred to the consent exception as being among the
“jealously and carefully drawn” exceptions to the general rule that all searches require
warrants).
23
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). In Bustamonte, the police were
conducting a search of a car based upon consent when they discovered evidence that was
later used to convict the driver of unlawfully possessing a check. Id. at 218. The Ninth
Circuit had held that the prosecution had to prove that consent was not only voluntary, but
was also given with the knowledge that it could be withheld. Id. However, the Supreme
Court held that so long as the consent is voluntary—meaning that, given the totality of the
circumstances, the individual was not coerced—officers need not inform individuals that
they have the right to refuse consent. Id. at 222.
24
See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Wright, Note, Third Party Consent Searches and the Fourth
Amendment: Refusal, Consent, and Reasonableness, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1841, 1859-61
(2005). Wright provides numerous hypothetical examples of disputed third party consent
in order to illustrate the nuances of the debate, including the veto model and the agency
model of determining common authority.
25
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971). In Coolidge the defendant’s wife
retrieved his guns and clothing from the house and turned them over to the police. Id. at
485. The defendant later sought to suppress this evidence at trial, however the Court held
that the wife’s voluntary action did not constitute a search and seizure by the government.
Id. at 488. The Court reasoned that the police had merely been questioning the defendant’s
wife and when she produced the clothing on her own volition, the police were not required
to avert their eyes and could accept the evidence without regard to the Fourth Amendment
rights of the defendant. Id.
26
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974). The defendant in Matlock had been
arrested in the yard of the house in which he lived with several other people. Id. Once the
defendant was detained in the police car, an officer sought the permission of one of the
other occupants to search the house, which she granted. Id. The Court held that the
occupant’s permission to search the premises was valid because: (1) the defendant was not
present to object to the search; and (2) the other occupant had common authority over the
premises such that she could grant permission. Id. at 170. Further, the court reasoned that
the other occupant’s common authority was determined, not by any sort of property
interest in the house, but instead by mutual use and control over the premises such that the
defendant could reasonably be said to have assumed the risk that she might consent to a
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Court held that a warrantless search is allowed even when a non-present
co-occupant subsequently objects to the search, provided police have
first obtained the voluntary consent of a third party who shares authority
over the area.27
Subsequent to Matlock, in Illinois v. Rodriguez28 the Court extended
the Matlock holding to situations in which the third party who consents
to a search does not have actual authority to do so.29 The Court held that
in the absence of actual authority, the third party must have apparent

search of the common area. Id. at 171. Thus, the warrantless search was proper under the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
27
Id. See also Wright, supra note 24, at 1857-58. Wright discusses two possible rationales
behind third party consent cases, both of which were mentioned in Matlock: (1) common
authority, meaning that each co-tenant has an individual right to consent to a search and is
consequently able to consent to a search of common areas; and (2) assumption of risk,
meaning that by sharing common space, each co-tenant assumes the risk that the other will
consent to a search. Id. at 1857. Wright states that third party cases are difficult to decide
because the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated which of the two rationales controls.
Id. at 1858. However, Wright ultimately concludes that the two theories mentioned in
Matlock actually work together. Id. In other words, when two people share common
authority over an area, they have assumed the risk. Id. Conversely, a primary party has
assumed the risk of a third party consenting to a search because each joint occupant has
common authority to consent to a search. Id. Thus, Wright concludes that the common
authority and assumption of risk theories are part of the same analysis according to the
reasoning in Matlock. Id.
28
Additionally, there were two main cases prior to Matlock that addressed third party
consent. In both cases the consent was held to be invalid because the primary party had no
expectations that they shared control over the premises with the third party. See Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964) (holding that a hotel clerk could not consent to the
search of a guest’s room because a hotel guest would have no reason to expect that a
manager could admit persons into the room other than hotel staff); Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961) (holding that a landlord does not have the authority to
consent to a search of the dwelling of a tenant because a tenant would not ordinarily expect
that the landlord may let visitors into the dwelling).
29
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990). In Rodriguez the police entered the
apartment of the defendant, who was asleep at the time and never consented to the search,
at the behest of the defendant’s girlfriend, who had given consent and let the officers into
the apartment with her key. Id. at 179. The defendant moved to suppress evidence that
had been collected during the search, claiming that his girlfriend had no authority to
consent to a search. Id. at 180. Although the Court agreed that the defendant’s girlfriend
had no authority over the apartment at the time of the search, it also found that the police
reasonably believed that she possessed the authority to grant the search. Id. at 183.
Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated because the search was reasonable
based on all of the information the police had at the time. Id. at 188.
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authority to consent to a search, which is determined by examining the
totality of the circumstances.30
However, despite the Supreme Court’s holdings in third party
consent cases, until recently, the law was still unclear when it came to
cases in which the police obtained third party consent for the search
while the present primary party objected.31 Although numerous cases at
both the state and federal level had held that third party consent
remained valid in the face of primary party objection, the Georgia
Supreme Court found the opposite in Randolph, disallowing third party
consent to override present primary party objection.32 Thus, when it
granted certiorari to Georgia v. Randolph, the Supreme Court sought to
determine whether third party consent to a government search is valid
under the Fourth Amendment when the primary party is present and
objects to the search.33
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH
A. The Randolph Opinion
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Georgia v. Randolph,
commentators speculated that the Court would side with the majority of
lower court cases and allow the permission of one co-tenant to trump the
30
Id. at 186. See also Wright, supra note 24, at 1858. Wright discusses how Rodriguez
complicates the analysis set forth by Matlock, which outlined the connection between
assumption of risk and common authority. Id. Specifically, Wright argues that Rodriguez
eliminated the concept of assumption of risk because a primary party could not possibly be
said to have assumed the risk of a possible search when the third party has no actual
authority. Id. Thus, Wright concludes that common authority, including a reasonable
belief of common authority, is the only basis for third party consent in following Rodriguez.
Id. For more discussion on assumption of risk and common authority, see supra note 27
and accompanying text (summarizing the theories of assumption of risk and primary
authority outlined in Matlock).
31
For a summary of the circuit split on the subject of third party consent, see Wright,
supra note 24, at 1862-72. Wright also classifies third party consent cases in which there is
present primary party refusal into two categories: the veto model and the agency model.
Id. First, under the veto model, one co-tenant can trump the consent of another co-tenant,
such that a warrantless search will not be allowed under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
However, under the agency model, a co-tenant is free to allow the police to search the
premises, even if the other co-tenant objects. Id.
32
See supra note 8 (listing federal appellate court decisions from three different circuits—
the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits—all of which held that third party consent was valid
even when the primary party was present and objecting). See also Love v. State, 138 S.W.3d
676, 680 (Ark. 2003) (in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that one roommate’s
consent to a search was valid in the face of the defendant’s refusal to give permission);
Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo. 1991) (same).
33
Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519 (2006).
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objection of another.34 Yet the decision that came down from the high
court in 2006 did just the opposite—it declared that when a primary
party is present and objects to a government search, third party consent
does not give the police the right to search the premises without a
warrant.35
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter began by briefly recounting
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the consent
exception to the Fourth Amendment.36
Although Justice Souter
acknowledged that no previous Supreme Court case had presented the
specific question at issue in Randolph—where a co-tenant is present and
objects to the search—he argued that the Court’s previous holding in
Matlock, specifically the social expectations test, framed the manner in
which the Court should assess Randolph. 37 Specifically, Justice Souter
argued that the Court must look to widely shared social expectations in
order to assess whether or not third party consent is proper, meaning the
Court must first ask whether it is expected by a particular co-tenant that
the other co-tenant would be able to consent to a search.38 Next the
Court must examine whether, under the particular circumstances of the
case, society would assume that each co-tenant could reasonably object
to a search.39

34
See, e.g., Steve Chapman, Upholding Our Right To Say No, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 29,
2006, at 13A. Chapman responded with surprise to the Randolph holding, arguing that
although common sense supports the Court’s decision, it is counter to the recent Supreme
Court trend of siding with the police on Fourth Amendment issues. Id. For example,
Chapman argues that by allowing the police to request a search without first informing an
individual that they have the right to refuse, the Court placed law enforcement
convenience above the privacy of individual citizens. Id. See also supra note 23 (providing
an overview of the Court’s holding in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte).
35
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
36
The majority in Randolph consisted of Justice Souter, the opinion’s author, joined by
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Additionally, Justices Stevens and Breyer
each filed concurring opinions. However, dissenting opinions were filed by Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice Alito took no part in deciding the case.
37
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1521. The Matlock holding is based on the dual analysis of the
social expectations test. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 (1979). Thus, the
reasoning behind the Matlock holding is clearly the underpinning of Justice Souter’s
opinion. However, Justice Souter does not address how the Court’s holding in Rodriquez
fits within this analysis. Clearly, the second prong of Matlock is satisfied in cases where
apparent authority exists. Yet, if protecting the expectations of the primary party is one
aim of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, then Rodriguez seems to fail on the first prong of
the Matlock analysis. Justice Souter only addressed Rodriquez when he factually
distinguished the case from Randolph. See infra note 50.
38
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1521.
39
Id.
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Accordingly, Justice Souter analyzed several other Fourth
Amendment cases in light of the social expectations test.40 In particular,
Justice Souter identified several instances where neither society nor
individuals would recognize the existence of a common understanding
that would allow third parties to admit guests or the police.41 For
example, Justice Souter pointed out that as established in Chapman and
Stoner, neither hotel managers nor landlords have the authority to
consent to a police search because both society and tenants/hotel guests
would not expect that such authority existed.42 Following this analysis,
Justice Souter stated that the major question in Randolph was whether
society and the particular co-tenants would recognize one co-tenant’s
right to refuse the invited guest of another, and he concluded that the
answer was an unequivocal “yes.”43 Thus, a co-tenant has no legally or
socially recognizable authority to prevail over another present and
objecting co-tenant.44
Furthermore, although Justice Souter admitted that a co-tenant has
an interest in not being held legally liable for another co-tenant’s illegal
activities, he stated that this interest is not enough to overcome the
Fourth Amendment’s protections.45 Additionally, Justice Souter
Id. at 1522. Note that although they bear the same name, the social expectations test
outlined in Katz differs from the social expectations test announced in Randolph.
Specifically, in the Katz dissent, Justice Harlan developed the social expectations test to
determine when a search has occurred under the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 20
and accompanying text (describing the Katz social expectations test in detail). In contrast,
in Randolph, Justice Souter used the test to determine when consent to a search is proper.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522. Thus, although the social expectations test is not new to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as a whole, its application in determining consent to
warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment is unprecedented.
41
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522.
42
Id. at 1522.
43
Id. at 1523. Pursuant to the social expectations test, Justice Souter based this
assessment on his observation that a visitor to a dwelling with two co-tenants would not
enter if one co-tenant objected. Id. But see id. at 1532 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (in which
Chief Justice Roberts questioned this assumption, noting that there could be limitless
variables, leading to situations in which the guest would stay). See also Robert V. Ward,
Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a
“Reasonable Person,” 36 HOW. L.J. 239 (1993) (arguing that the reasonable person test in the
context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is skewed because it assumes a generic
experience with police when, in reality, many inner city minority communities have deep
suspicions of the law enforcement community, and are thus highly likely to feel threatened
by police requesting a search); Bruce Fein, A Supreme Stumble, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2006,
at A21 (questioning the logic of the Justice Souter’s seemingly straightforward application
of the social expectations test).
44
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523.
45
Id. Justice Souter argued that there are several ways in which criminals can be
apprehended and innocent parties can be protected against the illegal activities of their co40
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discussed exigent circumstances, claiming that there was no risk that
Scott Randolph might destroy the evidence of his cocaine use.46
However, it would stand to reason that in most cases—especially those
in which the defendant would face a lengthy jail sentence if convicted—
there is always a strong possibility that evidence may be destroyed
before the police have time to obtain a warrant.47 Nonetheless, neither
the petitioner nor the dissent brought up the possibility of the existence
of any exigent circumstance, other than consent, that would make a
warrantless search proper.48 Additionally, Justice Souter dismissed the
claim made in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent that the majority’s holding
would protect spousal abusers.49
Finally, Justice Souter distinguished the facts in Randolph from those
in Matlock and Rodriguez, where the added detail of a physically present
inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a government search serves to

tenant, including: (1) the innocent co-tenant turning the evidence over to the police
without a search; (2) the innocent co-tenant simply telling the police what he or she knows
about a co-tenant’s criminal activities; (3) the police banning the tenant from the dwelling
until a warrant is acquired; or (4) the police undertaking a warrantless search when they
suspect that the tenant could destroy the evidence. Id. Yet, the majority concluded that
none of the above circumstances was present in Randolph. Id. Because there were no
exigent circumstances and Janet Randolph’s consent was invalid in the face of her
husband’s objection, the warrantless search was improper under the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
46
Id. Indeed, nowhere in the Petitioner’s Brief is there any mention of police suspicion
that Scott would destroy the evidence such that a warrantless search was necessary. Id.
47
Id. See also Adina Schwartz, Homes as Folding Umbrellas: Two Recent Supreme Court
Decisions on “Knock and Announce,” 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 545, 555 (1998) (stating that several
lower courts automatically recognize the exigent circumstance of the risk of destroyed
evidence in all drug cases because drugs are easily destroyed). But see United States v.
Bonner, 874 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Bonner, the defendants challenged convictions for
drug offenses, arguing that police officers failed to comply with the federal “knock and
announce” statute. In its reasoning, the court stated that the risks of evidence destruction
and violence constitute exigent circumstances to the requirements of the knock and
announce statute. Id. at 827. However, the court also stated that exigent circumstances in
warrantless search cases are different from exigent circumstances in knock and announce
cases, with the latter being a much looser standard. Id.
48
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1523.
49
Id. at 1524. The issue of spousal abuse runs throughout the Randolph opinion. For
example, Justice Souter stated that the issue in Randolph—whether spousal consent to a
search is proper—is different from the issues at play in domestic abuse cases because when
the police enter a home in response to a domestic abuse call, they are protected from being
accused of committing a trespass. Id. However, this protection does not, and the majority
concluded, should not, have any bearing on the police when they enter a dwelling for the
purposes of searching for evidence. Id. Justice Souter did, however, note that if the police
enter to protect a spouse, they can then collect any evidence they may find while in the
house. Id.
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trumps the consent of a fellow co-tenant.50 Accordingly, because Scott
Randolph refused to allow the police to search his home, the majority
held that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
even though his wife consented to the search.51
Additionally, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens recounted the
evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, observing that at the
time the Fourth Amendment was ratified, a woman would not have had
legal standing to refute her husband’s consent to a search.52 In a separate
concurring opinion, Justice Breyer focused on the flexibility of the
majority opinion, noting that there was no need for a bright line rule,
either allowing one co-tenant to always consent to a search or
prohibiting them from doing so across the board. 53 Instead, Justice
Breyer argued that a court must look to the “totality of the
circumstances,” under which the presence of domestic abuse or the
threat of evidence destruction would both constitute special reasons for a
police search, taking a case outside of Randolph’s narrow holding.54

50
Id. at 1527. Justice Souter distinguished the facts in Randolph from those in Matlock
and Rodriguez by stating that the rules in the latter two cases controlled only cases in which
the objecting party had not been present to object to the search, whereas the case in
Randolph involves a present and objecting co-tenant. Id. Accordingly, although Justice
Souter used the social expectation test from Matlock in arriving at the holding in Randolph,
he found that neither the Matlock holding, nor the Rodriguez holding, controlled the present
case. Id.
51
Id. at 1528.
52
Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens used this observation to
underscore the majority’s point that, today, neither husband nor wife has the power to
override the consent of the other when both are present for a police search. Id. Specifically,
he stated that neither can override the other’s constitutional right to enter their castle. Id.
Here, Justice Stevens appeared to be arguing that the majority opinion is evidence of
progress for women because modern law would now recognize a wife’s right to veto her
husband’s consent to a search, although in Randolph the situation was reversed, with the
husband’s refusal vetoing the wife’s consent to a search. See also Mary E. Becker,
Interdisciplinary Approach, The Politics of Women’s Wrongs and the Bill of “Rights”: A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 508 (1992) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment may have made women worse off by providing a foundation for the notion
that a man’s home is his castle, thus allowing private property rights to trump the need for
police protection for abused women). But see infra text accompanying notes 59-61
(discussing how Justice Scalia refutes Justice Stevens’s concurrence).
53
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring). Whereas Justice Stevens’s
concurrence focuses on refuting the idea that the majority opinion furthers women’s rights,
Justice Breyer’s concurrence seems to emphasize the case specific nature of the holding in
order to refute the idea that it would result in a frustration of police purposes, ongoing
crime, or increased domestic abuse. Id.
54
Id.
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Writing in a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts attacked the
principle rationale behind the majority’s holding: the social expectations
test.55 First, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the majority was wrong in
concluding that no one would enter over the objection of one protesting
co-occupant.56 Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the majority
rule is random in its application and predicted that it would lead to a
subjective application by the police.57 Finally, Chief Justice Roberts
argued that the social expectations test should be supplanted in cases
such as Randolph when privacy has been waived because property is
shared with another person.58
Justice Scalia, also dissenting, refuted Justice Stevens’s concurrence,
claiming that his analysis was both flawed and irrelevant.59 Justice Scalia
asserted that Justice Stevens confused the Constitution, which does not
change, with the bodies of law to which it refers, which do change.60
Specifically, he argued that the violation of the Fourth Amendment
referred to prevailing notions of property rights, under which both sexes
are equal partners. Id. Yet, Justice Scalia argued that the majority
decision does not further women’s rights and will have the practical
effect of allowing men to keep women from permitting police to enter

55
Supra text accompanying notes 37-42 (providing an overview of the social
expectations test, as described by the majority in Randolph).
56
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Specifically, Chief Justice
Roberts stated that the majority opinion rested upon an assumption that an invited guest
who is turned away by a co-occupant would simply go away. Id. Instead, Chief Justice
Roberts imagined several scenarios in which an invited houseguest would not go away. Id.
In addition to questioning this assumption, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the social
expectations test had been used in the past only to determine when a search had taken
place, not to determine questions of consent under the Fourth Amendment. Id. See also
Wright, supra note 24. Wright, in her exhaustive summary of third party consent searches
does not even mention the social expectations test, which the majority in Randolph uses as
its rationale for the holding. Id.
57
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the Randolph holding
does not extend veto power to co-tenants who are present but asleep, or present but in
another room, and is thus arbitrary). But see id. at 1527 (majority opinion) (in which the
majority noted that the added detail of a present and objecting co-tenant required the Court
to draw a formalistic line, separating cases where the co-tenant is present from those where
he or she, for whatever reason, is not).
58
Id. at 1532 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Instead of the social expectations test that the
majority depends upon, the Chief Justice would use the assumption of risk theory,
reasoning that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy and people give up some of that
privacy when they share property with others. Id. In other words, Justice Roberts argued
that Scott Randolph assumed the risk that his wife might consent to a search, thus waiving
his Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
59
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60
Id.
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the home in order to stop domestic violence.61 Justice Thomas, in a final
lone dissent, asserted that the search in Randolph was not a search at all
under the Fourth Amendment and accordingly, Coolidge should
control.62
B. Appraisal of the Social Expectations Test
Throughout the various opinions in Randolph, an array of topics was
discussed, including domestic abuse, police efficiency, and original
intent, but the majority relied primarily on the social expectations test.63
The Randolph holding is a strong reassertion of a citizen’s right to refuse a
police search, however this fact is underemphasized in a majority
opinion that treats assumptions as established facts.64 Instead, by relying
on the social expectations test, and its accompanying hypothetical
illustrations, the majority paved the way for pointed dissent that appears

Id.
Id. at 1541 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that Coolidge should control Randolph
because Janet Randolph showed the police to the bedroom where the evidence was found,
thus the officer did not conduct a general search under the Fourth Amendment). See also
supra note 25 (discussing Coolidge).
63
See supra note 37 (providing an overview of the social expectations test, as described
by the majority in Randolph).
64
See supra text accompanying notes 37-39 (providing a summary of the assumptions
regarding co-tenant behavior put forth by Justice Souter in the majority opinion). See also
Janice Nadler, No Need To Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT.
REV. 153 (2002). Nadler argues that the Supreme Court’s holdings in consent search cases
runs counter to scientific knowledge regarding how citizens comply with police. Id. at 156.
Specifically, Nadler argues that the assumption, inherent in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, that citizens are aware they can refuse a search, is a fallacy. Id. Moreover,
Nadler argues that such assumptions regarding human behavior are merely a device for
the Court to reach its desired holding. Id.
61
62

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2006], Art. 9

512

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

legally and factually sound,65 even while urging a holding that would
limit the very rights that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect.66
In contrast, the majority was at its strongest when discussing the
formalistic line that must be drawn in Randolph due to the presence of an
objecting co-tenant because this reasoning places Randolph squarely
within a continuum of Fourth Amendment cases that seek to protect
property interests without requiring officers to go beyond reasonable
measures in doing so.67 Indeed, the confusion inherent in the majority
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1532 (Roberts, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief Justice
Roberts questioned the social expectations test, emphasizing that by relying on the test, the
majority in Randolph has incorporated an “assumption” into the Constitution. Id. Chief
Justice Roberts then illustrated the flaws in this assumption by listing situations in which
the social expectations test would allow a visitor into a dwelling over the express objections
of a third party, postulating: (1) that in situations where the persons sharing a dwelling are
feuding roommates, a friend of the first roommate may very well enter the apartment
despite the express objection of the second; (2) that visitors who traveled a great distance or
came for a special occasion would not necessarily turn away upon one roommate’s
objection; (3) that a visitor would not be expected to stay out of an apartment in which
there is a common area and a room to which the objecting roommate could retreat; and (4)
when one roommate objects to a visitor and two or three roommate consent to the visitor it
is possible the visitor would still enter the apartment. Id. Such hypothetical situations
serve to illuminate the flaws in the social expectations test by illustrating that social
expectations are too complex and varied to allow uniform results.
66
Id. at 1531. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent would have held that even in situations
where the co-tenant who opposes the search is present and objecting, valid third party
consent can override the objecting co-tenant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. Thus, under
Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis, the constitutional rights of the objecting party, though
clearly and vehemently asserted to an officer at the time of the search, could be waived by
another individual. This forfeiture of Constitutional rights would occur despite a lack of
warrant and a lack of probable cause, the two requirements that the court had previously
required for Fourth Amendment searches under the Katz analysis. See supra note 3
(discussing the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment and the Court’s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment under Katz). Some would argue that Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent
could be seen as increasing the efficiency of the police to conduct searched. See, e.g., Fein,
supra note 43 (criticizing the majority opinion in Randolph as hindering the ability of police
to conduct efficient and effective searches). However, as the Court previously held, the
state’s desire for police efficiency is not, on its own, enough to overcome Fourth
Amendment protection. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (“The
warrant requirement . . . is not an inconvenience to somehow be ‘weighed’ against the
claims of police efficiency.”). Furthermore, when exigent circumstances exist, the Court
has held that the need for police efficiency may then allow a warrantless search. See supra
note 45 (detailing Justice Souter’s list of exigent circumstances that would justify immediate
action on the part of the police in conducting a search). Thus, Chief Justice Roberts’s
dissent in Randolph would allow a forfeiture of the Fourth Amendment rights of
individuals, while only nominally increasing police efficiency because measures are
already in place to secure the latter concern.
67
See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (rejecting the necessity of
the police informing individuals that they have the right to refuse to consent to a search).
See also Note, The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the Overlooked Function of
65
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opinion’s social expectations test is illustrated by several subsequent
search and seizure cases. For example, one court has used the social
expectations test to determine not only whether the police had the right
to search a dwelling, but also whether the police could search for a
particular item within a house.68 Thus, it seems that in the wake of
Randolph, the social expectations test has the potential to extend beyond
the scope of Randolph’s narrow holding.69
Similarly, only a few months after its publication, Randolph has
already been cited in several lower court cases in which the defendant
has tried to invoke the Randolph social expectations test in order to argue
that evidence be declared inadmissible.70 In such situations, courts must
distinguish cases from Randolph based on the facts of the case in order to

the Consent Doctrine, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2006) (arguing that, despite rampant criticism
of the Supreme Court’s use of the consent doctrine in Fourth Amendment cases, consent
has actually allowed the Court to continue to emphasize the government’s interest in
maintaining order, while returning to individuals the autonomy to stand up for their own
rights).
68
See also Glenn v. Commonwealth, 633 S.E.2d 205, 209 (Va. App. 2006). In Glenn, the
police had reason to believe that Glenn had robbed a pedestrian. Id. Days later, the police
arrived at the home of Glenn’s grandfather, arrested Glenn, and asked his grandfather for
consent to search the house, which was given. Id. Although Glenn was present and was
not asked for permission, he also did not object to the search. Id. Within the house the
police found a backpack containing evidence that linked Glenn to the robbery. Id. Glenn
later filed a motion to suppress the evidence that had been found in the backpack in the
house, arguing that no consent had been given to search the backpack. Id. at 210.
69
Id. at 225. The court used the Randolph social expectations test in determining that the
consent Glenn’s grandfather gave to search the house extended to consent to search the
backpack therein. Id. The court reasoned that according to pervading notions of property
rights, home ownership, and social expectations, any consent to search a house includes
consent to search the property therein. Id. However, the Randolph holding clearly
concerned only the question of third party consent, not the question of consent as it applies
to various portions of a dwelling. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1528 (stating that the case
required a straightforward application of the question of third part consent).
70
See, e.g., United States v. Young, No. 5:05CR63-01-02, 2006 WL 1302667, at *7 (N.D. W.
Va. May 9, 2006) (memorandum opinion and order affirming and adopting report and
recommendation of Magistrate Judge). In Young, Young had shared an apartment with
Grose. Id. at *2. Subsequently, Grose moved out of the apartment, although she still had a
key and several of her personal items, as well as items she shared with Young left at the
apartment. Id. A month after moving out, Grose signed a form giving consent to a
detective to search the apartment she had shared with Young. Id. The search garnered
heroin and firearms in violation of Young’s parole agreement, and cash, all of which were
seized. Id. Young later filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing in part that the
case should be analyzed under Randolph, on the understanding that no reasonable person
would hold that Grose retained a right to permit entry into the premises that she had
vacated. Id. at *7.
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keep the social expectations test from allowing outcomes that would be
inconsistent with other Fourth Amendment cases.71
Accordingly, as subsequent cases illustrate, the danger of the
Randolph majority’s reliance on the social expectations test is that it will
result in courts attempting to make sense of the test rather than focusing
on the true purpose behind the Fourth Amendment. Instead, what
ought to be at issue in subsequent search and seizure cases is the need to
strike the proper balance between property rights and police efficiency.
Still, notwithstanding its emphasis on the social expectations test, the
Randolph holding serves as a testament to the protection of privacy and
property rights that is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment by
preventing the consent of one co-tenant to override the express refusal of
a fellow co-tenant who is present and objects to a government search.
V. CONCLUSION
The reaction to the Randolph holding has been mixed, with some
hailing the decision as a protection of individual rights and others
lamenting it as an assault on police protection.72 Yet even if the
majority’s reliance on the social expectations test is flawed, the outcome
in Randolph is not. Moreover, if the majority reasoned its way to a
conclusion in Randolph, they at least reasoned to the right conclusion,
such that the Fourth Amendment is preserved. Thus, after the Randolph
holding, the rights of a present and objecting co-tenant is enough to
override the consent of a fellow co-tenant but, above all, the consent
71
Id. Young asserted that the case should be analyzed on the understanding that no
reasonable person would hold that Grose retained a right to permit entry into the premises
that she had vacated. Id. Regardless of whether or not Grose’s permission passed the
social expectations test, the court held that Randolph’s social expectations test did not apply
to Young’s situation because unlike Randolph, who was present and objected to the search,
Young was not present when the police searched his apartment. Id. This underscores one
of the difficulties with the social expectations test—although it may have justified the
Randolph holding, the test also has the potential to justify other search and seizure holdings
that are well outside the scope of Randolph. In Young, the court had to steer the line of
reasoning away from Randolph’s social expectations test, which would have led to an
illogical holding, and toward the Rodriguez test, arguing that regardless of whether Grose
had the authority to consent to a search, the police in Young reasonably believed that she
had the authority to do so. Id. at *8. See also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990)
(holding that that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures was not violated because the search was reasonable based on all of
the information the police had at the time).
72
Compare Fein, supra note 43 (criticizing Randolph for preventing the police from
conducting adequate searches), with Chapman, supra note 34 (supporting Randolph for
upholding the individual’s right to refuse to allow the police to search one’s home).
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exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for
government searches remains jealously guarded.
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